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Abstract
In this paper we study the influence of random network fluctuations on the behavior of evolutionary games on Baraba ´si–
Albert networks. This network class has been shown to promote cooperation on social dilemmas such as the Prisoner’s
Dilemma and the Snowdrift games when the population network is fixed. Here we introduce exogenous random
fluctuations of the network links through several noise models, and we investigate the evolutionary dynamics comparing
them with the known static network case. The results we obtain show that even a moderate amount of random noise on
the network links causes a significant loss of cooperation, to the point that cooperation vanishes altogether in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma when the noise rate is the same as the agents’ strategy revision rate. The results appear to be robust since they are
essentially the same whatever the type of the exogenous noise. Besides, it turns out that random network noise is more
important than strategy noise in suppressing cooperation. Thus, even in the more favorable situation of accumulated payoff
in which links have no cost, the mere presence of random external network fluctuations act as a powerful limitation to the
attainment of high levels of cooperation.
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Introduction
In the last decade, thanks to advances in network science, a
large number of studies dealing with evolutionary games on
networks have appeared. The underlying idea is that the classical
infinite, well-mixed populations used in the theory [1] are not a
particularly good approximation to the actual shape of the
contacts that take place in society, although they do allow rigorous
mathematical results to be reached. Indeed, social interactions
between agents are mediated by finite networks of contacts, which
is why there is a strong interest in the study of this kind of collective
systems. For a synthesis of the main results obtained in the
last years, we refer the reader to the following reviews which,
altogether, give the state of the art in the field of evolutionary
games on networks [2–4].
At the beginning, investigations were targeted at static networks,
i.e. networks that do not change during time. A very good
summary of this case is provided by Roca et al. [3]. This is an
acceptable approximation when network changes are slow with
respect to behavioral changes of the agents and it is a useful first
step. However, actual social networks are dynamical entities in
which agents may leave the network, new agents may join it, and
links can be formed and dismissed as well. So, the more general
models should be dynamical, and several approaches have been
suggested to deal with these time-dependent aspects of the network
structure in evolutionary games; an excellent recent review is
contained in [4]. Most models assume a constant population
structure, i.e. no agent leaves or join the network, which means
that the system is at equilibrium with respect to exchanges of
‘‘matter’’. This of course removes the need of dealing with the rate
of change _ N N of N, since _ N N~0. The condition also holds when the
number of agents entering the system is the same as those leaving
it, but this would complicate matters since contacts would change.
For this reason it is assumed that there is no flow through the
system boundaries. On the other hand, the number of links L may
be subject to internal change and, even if L stays constant (_ L L~0),
it will generally be the case that links are actually being rewired
among different pairs of agents. The above is the most often used
scenario, although some works have also dealt with growing
networks under strategic conditions, e.g. see [5] and the abundant
economic literature on strategic network formation as summa-
rized, for example, in [6]. In all cases, only pairwise interactions
are considered at first: although n-person interactions are
important, it is believed that two-person games are a first useful
and necessary step and will be assumed here too.
Now, link rewiring can be either an exogenous random
phenomenon, or it can obey some other rule. If it is completely
random, then the network drifts toward randomness itself, in the
sense that its degree distribution tends to be Poissonian. This is not
an interesting case since we already know from the static case [3,7]
that random graphs are not particularly conducive to cooperative
interactions between agents. Besides, actual social networks are not
random and thus this is not a realistic case either. Thus others,
perhaps more socially-inspired relinking patterns, have been
postulated. For example, the models presented in [8,9] try to
take into account a kind of strategic ‘‘negotiation’’ between the
concerned pair of connected nodes in order to decide whether a
given link must be cut or not, while in other cases the decision is
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9unilateral [10,11] and only affects certain types of links, usually
defector-defector ones. The rewiring phase, on the other hand, has
often been related to triadic closure i.e., the formation of links
among agents that have a neighbor in common have been favored
[9,10]. Starting from a random graph whose clustering coefficient
tends to 0 as N??, this will cause a bias towards an increase of
the mean clustering coefficient of the whole network. The reason
behind this bias is that triadic closure is a well known observed
feature of actual social networks. A recent related theoretical work
on the dynamics of link rewiring in games, using explicit rewiring
probabilities based on link type and Markov chains analysis has
appeared in [12].
In this study we take a different approach and treat network
dynamics as an exogenous phenomenon that is undoubtedly present
to a larger or smaller extent but of which we do not know neither
the exact origins nor the actual stochastic behavior. Thus, we shall
assume that the network links are simply subject to noise. This
point of view is justified by the fact that there is a large variety of
social networks and, although some global statistical features such
as degree distribution, mean degree, degree correlations, mean
clustering coefficient and so on tend to be similar across networks,
there is not, as yet, a general theory that explains every single
network aspect when it comes to their dynamical behavior. In
other words, instead of formulating some mechanisms that are
supposed to be responsible for link evolution, we shall take
inspiration from empirical data coming from some time-resolved
studies of social network evolution to postulate general forms of
network noise that are expected to describe, in a statistical sense,
how the network links fluctuate. It is not the case that strategic
network formation issues are unimportant; we only think that
many networks are under the influence of largely unknown
exogenous dynamically changing variables and we would like to
lump all of them together under the form of unspecified
fluctuations. The following step is to study through numerical
simulations the effects of such network fluctuations on the behavior
of paradigmatic evolutionary games.
Games on Networks
We have studied the four classical two-person, two-strategies
games described by the payoff bi-matrix of Table 1.
In this matrix, R stands for the reward the two players receive if
they both cooperate (C), P is the punishment for bilateral defection
(D), and T is the temptation, i.e. the payoff that a player receives if
she defects while the other cooperates. In the latter case, the
cooperator gets the sucker’s payoff S. The parameters’ values are
restricted to the standard configuration space defined by R=1,
P=0, 21#S#1, and 0#T#2. In the resulting TS-plane, each
game’s space corresponds to a different quadrant depending on
the ordering of the payoffs. If the payoff values are ordered such
that T.R.P.S then defection is always the best rational
individual choice, so that (D,D) is the unique Nash Equilibrium
(NE) and also the only Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) [1] and
we get the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game. Mutual cooperation would
be socially preferable but C is strongly dominated by D.
In the Snowdrift (SD) game, the order of P and S is reversed,
yielding T.R.S.P. Thus, in the SD when both players defect
they each get the lowest payoff. (C,D)and (D,C) are NE of the game
in pure strategies. There is a third equilibrium in mixed strategies
which is the only dynamically stable state, while the two pure NE
are not [1]. Players have a strong incentive to play D, which is
harmful for both parties if the outcome produced happens to be
(D,D).
With the ordering R.T.P.S we get the Stag Hunt (SH) game
in which mutual cooperation (C,C) is the best outcome, Pareto-
superior, and a NE. The second NE, where both players defect is
less efficient but also less risky. The dilemma is represented by the
fact that the socially preferable coordinated equilibrium (C,C)
might be missed for ‘‘fear’’ that the other player will play D
instead. The third mixed-strategy NE in the game is evolutionarily
unstable [1].
Finally, the Harmony game has R.S.T.P or R.T.S.P. C
strongly dominates D and the trivial unique NE is (C,C). This game
is non-conflictual by definition and does not cause any dilemma: we
include it just to complete the quadrants of the parameter space.
With the above conventions, in the figures that follow, the PD
space is the lower right quadrant; the SH is the lower left
quadrant, and the SD is in the upper right one. Finally, Harmony
is represented by the upper left quadrant.
Results
Recent research on evolutionary games on static networks has
shown that network reciprocity effects may favor cooperation to a
fair extent in games, such as the PD, in which it would be doomed if
the interacting population were well mixed [3,7,13]. In particular,
largely degree-inhomogeneous networks topologies such as Bar-
aba ´si–Albert (BA) scale-free networks seem to possess the ingredi-
ents that boost cooperation the most. Network reciprocity in this
case is facilitated and stabilized by cooperators that get hold of hub
nodes, are surrounded mostly by cooperators, and are connected to
other cooperator hubs [14]. Social networks also seem to be able to
enhance cooperation [15,16], albeit to a lesser extent than the ideal
scale-free case. In social networks too there is degree inhomogeneity
expressed by broad-scale degree distribution functions, although
usually the tails fall off faster than in scale-free networks. Here other
mechanisms play a role besides highly connected nodes: they
manifest themselves through clustering and the presence of
community boundaries, which are almost absent in BA networks.
These features of actual social networks may favor cooperation with
respect to well mixed populations. Because they are the best
cooperation amplifiers among the studied network models, and thus
they represent a kind of upper bound, we focus our numerical
simulation study on Baraba ´si–Albert scale-free networks. The
construction of BA networks is well known and will be briefly
described in the Methods section. The simulations start by
randomly distributing cooperators and defectors among the
networks’ nodes in the same proportion. The simulations then
proceed until a steady state is reachedand, at this point averages are
computed. In a steady state strategy fluctuations are smoothed out
both in static and noisy networks. For more details the reader is
referred to the Methods section.
Sequence of Random BA networks
The first numerical experiment is to compare the behavior of
evolutionary games on static BA networks and time-varying
Table 1. Generic payoff bi-matrix for the two-person,
two-strategies symmetric games.
CD
C (R,R)( S,T)
D (T,S)( P,P)
C and D are the possible strategies, and R,T,P,a n dS are payoff values as
discussed in the text.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025555.t001
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stochastic process fG(t),t~0,1,...g in which each G(t)i sa n
independently generated BA graph with the same size and mean
degree while in the static case there is a single graph G(0) which is
used all along. Clearly, by construction all the graphs in the
sequence fG(t)g have equivalent degree distributions. During an
epoch t the players, which initially randomly receive a strategy
s[fC,Dg, will synchronously play the given game with their
neighbors. In the dynamic case, with a certain frequency
v~1=Dt, the population graph is rebuilt at each Dt time steps.
Players are numbered, and their current strategies are conserved
when the network changes, but their neighborhood will in general
be different. This process is not a likely one socially because it
entails too much uncorrelated change, but it is simple and clear
from a theoretical point of view. It will thus be used as a
benchmark case in the following, as it represents the extreme case
in which there is no correlation between successive instances of the
network and each new network is an i.i.d. random variable. In all
cases we start with the same number of cooperators and defectors
randomly distributed over the network nodes. Other initial
proportions are also interesting to investigate, as it has been done
for the static case by Roca et al. [3]. Here, however, we shall focus
on the comparison between the static and the dynamic cases and
not so much on the robustness of results with respect to the initial
conditions.
Fig. 1 shows the average amount of cooperation at the end of
the simulations on dynamically generated BA networks (central
and right image) with respect to the static case (leftmost image).
The strategy update rule is replicator dynamics (see Methods Sect.
for details on this revision protocol).
The trend is clear: cooperation is negatively affected by the
network noise, and the effect is more pronounced the higher the
noise from left to right. The two games that are the most affected
are the PD and the SH, while the SD game is the least affected.
This was expected since, while PD and SH have monomorphic
dynamically stable states, in the SD the equilibrium state is a
dimorphic population.
Figure 2 shows the same dynamics but using unconditional
imitation of the best instead of replicator dynamics. Here the focal
player imitates the strategy of the neighbor having obtained the
highest payoff, including himself (see Methods section). Looking at
the static case (leftmost image) it is already clear that there is a
lower amount of cooperation to start with in the PD quadrant, as
well as in the SH case with respect to random graphs, while
cooperation is high for the SD game (see Roca et al. [3] for a
detailed discussion of these effects). Adding network noise has little
effect but still the tiny amount of cooperation existing is almost
completely lost when the noise level reaches the value one. A
tentative qualitative explanation of the relative insensitivity to
noise in this case is the following. The way in which a new network
is generated in the noisy case (see above) tells us that, on the
average, a given player will have more or less the same proportion
of cooperators and defectors as neighbors in the new network as in
the previous one. Since deterministic unconditional imitation rule
depends on the global state of the neighborhood, it seems likely
that the network dynamics will not have a large effect in this case.
Table 2 summarizes the numerical results by giving the average
value of cooperation in the three non-trivial games for static and
dynamic networks, and for the two strategy revision rules. From
the table, the trend towards loss of cooperation in randomly
fluctuating networks becomes very clear.
Fluctuations from Network Edge Swap
The independent sequence of BA graphs used above constitutes
an ideal situation that can be considered as a baseline case, but it is
quite far from a realistic link evolution in a given single network.
To do a step towards more realism, we shall now assume that the
sequence of graphs fG(0),G(1),...g is generated by successively
rewiring an initial given graph as suggested in [17]. We begin with
G(0) being a Baraba ´si–Albert network; then, starting at time t=1,
each successive graph G(t) in the sequence is generated by
swapping two randomly chosen non-adjacent pair of edges in the
previous graph G(t21). In contrast to the previous case, where the
sequence of graphs was an i.i.d. one, this process is a Markov chain
since each new graph in the sequence depends on the previous
one. The edge swap preserves the degree distribution P(k)o fG and
obviously the node’s degree and the mean degree as well. The
graphs, however, become more and more randomized as time
goes by, as they tend to loose the historical degree correlations
between hubs that arise in the original BA construction. Note that
in this case we assume an asynchronous dynamics since it is, in our
opinion, qualitatively more adapted to the new situation. Results
are almost the same with either synchronous or asynchronous
dynamics as shown in [3]. For the BA networks and replicator
dynamics, this is also clear from the leftmost images in Figs. 1 and
3. Thus, instead of updating all the players’ strategies at once in
Figure 1. Asymptotic distribution of strategies in the TS plane in static and dynamic BA networks using replicator dynamics as an
update rule. Initial density of cooperators is 0.5 uniformly distributed at random in all cases. Leftmost image: the static case. Middle image:
frequency v of network generation is 0.1; rightmost image: v~1. Values are averages over 100 independent runs.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025555.g001
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(with replacement). This is called an elementary time step. The
period of network rewiring in this case is the number of elementary
steps before an edge swap takes place, and the frequency v is just
the reciprocal of this number.
The visual results for this kind of generic network noise under
replicator dynamics are shown in Fig. 3, while the measured final
average values are given in Table 3. It is clear that, in agreement
with the previous model of noise, even a moderate amount of
network links fluctuation gives rise to a serious loss of cooperation
in all the non-trivial games. To be more precise, after a good deal
of edge swapping, the resulting networks, although they keep the
original degree distribution, are close to scale-free random graphs
generated according to the configuration model [17]. Cooperation
frequencies on random scale-free graphs of the latter type are still
better than random Erdo ¨s-Re ´nyi graphs results (see [8] and
especially [18], where a complete analysis of cooperation in the PD
in random scale-free graphs is provided). However, they are
significantly lower than those found in BA networks due to the loss
of some early hubs interconnections that are present in BA
networks because of the temporal growing process [18]. Thus, the
reasons for the loss of cooperation are both the topology changes
induced by the above loss of interconnected hubs, and especially
the noisy neighborhoods induced by the edge swaps.
Fluctuations from Edge Rewiring
Once more, the previous assumed network fluctuation, although
it is of theoretical interest, is still far from what happens in real
networks. Experimental observations on dynamically changing
social networks show that global statistics such as P(k), the mean
degree SkT, the mean clustering coefficient SCT all remain similar
but not exactly the same, they fluctuate to some extent during
network evolution. This is true for growing networks, which are
the majority of those that have been observed, but also for time-
resolved studies of constant-size ones. These kind of results have
been reported, among others, in [19–23]. Inspired by these
considerations, we shall thus examine a third random dynamics
that, without making strong assumptions on how players have
their links cut and rewired, nevertheless provides fluctuations of
the main network quantities similar to what seems to happen in
real social networks. This should allow us to check whether the
conclusions reached with the two previous models are robust
enough starting from a BA network. Rewiring works as follow:
1. a node i is chosen with probability proportional to its degree ki
and one of its neighbors j[V(i) is selected with uniform
probability
2. the corresponding fijg link is suppressed
3. node j creates a new link with a node l[V anywhere in the
graph with probability proportional to l’s degree (preferential
attachment)
4. to conserve minimum degree kmin, if nodes i or j have degree
kmin they are not considered for rewiring and two other nodes
are selected
This process makes highly connected nodes more likely to loose
a link but, on the other hand, it also gives them more probability of
being chosen for a new connection. The network statistics do
change but they remain relatively close to the starting BA graph.
In our simulations, after many rewirings, the network degree
distribution function does remain broad-scale in average, but the
tail tends to fall off faster than the original power-law. Figure 4
shows the degree distribution functions for the original and the
rewired networks for two levels of noise averaged over 1000 graph
realizations. For the rewired networks, the graphs refer to the final
configurations. From the curves, one can see that for low noise
(v~0:1) the rewired networks have almost the same distribution
as the original BA ones. On the other hand, when the noise is high
(v~1) the networks undergo a more marked change and the
resulting degree distributions are closer to an exponential, as seen
in the left image of Fig. 4 where the scales on the axes are lin-log.
Figure 2. Asymptotic distribution of strategies in the TS plane in static and dynamic BA networks using unconditional imitation of
the best neighbor as an update rule. Initial density of cooperators is 0.5 uniformly distributed at random in all cases. Leftmost image: the static
case. Increasing towards the right: frequency v of network generation is 0.1 and 1. Values are averages over 100 independent runs.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025555.g002
Table 2. Asymptotic average cooperation fraction in static
and noisy BA networks.
PD, ib PD, rd SD, ib SD, rd SH, ib SH, rd
Static BA networks 0.030 0.131 0.863 0.823 0.597 0.615
Dynamic Network (v~0:1) 0.027 0.025 0.890 0.778 0.582 0.490
Dynamic Network (v~1:0) 0.021 0.009 0.870 0.572 0.538 0.364
‘ib’ and ‘rd’ stand for ‘imitate the best’ and ‘replicator dynamics’ update rules
respectively. PD, SD, and SH design the Prisoners Dilemma, Snowdrift, and Stag
Hunt games respectively. The table refers to Figs. 1 and 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025555.t002
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static social networks do give results that are between these two
limit cases, i.e. a power-law and an exponential distribution
[24,25].
The simulations proceed in an asynchronous manner, as
explained in the edge swap case above. Figure 5 depicts the
behavior of the four game classes on networks undergoing the
above link fluctuations. The leftmost image is given for
comparison; it refers to a static graph that has been first rewired
so as to randomize the links as explained above, before being used
as a fixed population topology. The middle and rightmost images
depict the noisy cases with a frequency of rewiring of 0.1 (middle)
and 1 (right). It is to be remarked that the static rewired network
does not become an Erdo ¨s-Re ´nyi random graph, and still allows
for a fair amount of cooperation with respect to the pure BA case
reported in the leftmost image of Fig. 3. Thus, the loss of
cooperation observed as the network fluctuates is significant and
can lead to full defection for the PD when rewiring and revising
strategy have the same time scale (rightmost image). Snowdrift and
SH are less negatively affected. The average final values for the
three games are reported in Table 4. The conclusion that we can
draw from the results obtained with the three network fluctuation
models is the following: whatever the source of random link
fluctuations, as soon as the amount of noise becomes non-
negligible i.e., as soon as network changes are at least ten times
slower than strategy revision, the cooperation levels observed on
static networks become weaker and they are completely lost when
link noise and strategy update occur at the same rate. This
conclusion is valid for all the non-trivial games studied, but it is
particularly visible in the PD quadrant where defection becomes
complete for v~1.
Network and Strategy Noise
Until now, we have studied the impact of network fluctuations
on typical evolutionary games. Another common source of noise in
games arises from strategy errors. These are meant to capture
various sources of uncertainty such as deliberate and involuntary
decision errors which might play the role of experimentation in the
environment, or be related to insufficient familiarity with the
game. One easy way to include strategy noise is to use the Fermi
function [2] as an update rule (see the Methods section for
definitions). The parameter b in the function gives the amount of
noise: a low b corresponds to high probability of error and,
conversely, high b means that errors will be rare. One may ask
how much these errors influence cooperation in networks of
contacts, and whether they combine positively or negatively with
network noise. As for their influence on static BA networks, the
answer has been given in [3], where it is shown that for low noise
(b=10) the equilibrium behavior is similar to the one seen with
replicator dynamics, while values of b close to 0.01 are enough to
suppress all residual cooperation in the PD. In this case selection is
weak, payoffs and network structure play a less important role. In
other words, only comparatively high rates of strategy errors are
really detrimental to cooperation. But when network fluctuations
are present, cooperation is quickly lost, even for values of b that
still allow for a fair amount of cooperation in the static case.
Figure 6 shows this for a static network (leftmost image) as well as
for two levels of network noise (central and right image) for
b=0.1. Network noise has been created as in our first model, i.e.
by generating a sequence of independent BA networks with
frequency v.
Table 5 gives the asymptotic average values of cooperation in
the three non-trivial games for static and dynamic networks.
Although in the static case there is still a certain amount of
cooperation in spite of the fact that b is relatively low, adding
network noise quickly makes the situation worse. In conclusion, we
can say that both kinds of errors tend to hinder cooperation, but
network noise is more important than strategy noise in disrupting
cooperation on degree-heterogeneous networks.
Figure 3. Asymptotic distribution of strategies in the TS plane in static and dynamic BA networks using replicator dynamics as an
update rule. Strategy update dynamics is asynchronous and the initial BA graph is rewired as explained in the text. Initial density of cooperators is
0.5 uniformly distributed at random in all cases. Leftmost image: the static case. Middle image: frequency v of network rewiring is 0.1; rightmost
image: v~1. Values are averages over 100 independent runs.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025555.g003
Table 3. Asymptotic average cooperation fraction in static
and dynamic networks with edge swap using replicator
dynamics as a strategy update rule.
PD SD SH
Static BA Networks 0.131 0.825 0.617
Dynamic Network (v~0:1) 0.055 0.699 0.576
Dynamic Network (v~1:0) 0.017 0.591 0.523
Values refer to Fig. 3.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025555.t003
Network Fluctuations Hinder Cooperation
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 October 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 10 | e25555Discussion
The finding that fixed Baraba ´si–Albert scale-free networks of
contacts notably increase cooperation in social dilemmas has been
an important one [8,14] and has raised substantial hope, since
scale-free graphs are better representations of actual networks of
contacts than the random graphs and regular lattices that have
often been used in the past. However, subsequent studies have
somehow reduced its scope for various reasons. In the first place,
the gains in cooperation can be partially or totally offset if players
must pay an extra cost in order to maintain more contacts, as
suggested by Masuda [26]. In a similar way if average, instead of
accumulated payoff is used, the advantage of degree heterogeneity
is lost as the individual’s payoff is divided by its degree in the graph
[27,28]. The latter seems to be an extreme case but it still shows in
another way that the cost for an agent to maintain few or many
links cannot be the same, although it certainly depends on the
social context. Furthermore, if the players’ decision rule is partially
conventional, some of the advantage is equally lost. For example,
this has been shown to happen when agents have a conformist
component to their behavior [29]. Finally, even when none of the
above applies, the amount of cooperation gain due to network
reciprocity can still be slim or non-existent depending on the
strategy update rule and several other factors. This has been
shown, among many other things, in the extensive studies of Roca
et al. [3,30] where it appears that using deterministic best response
Figure 4. Empirical degree distribution functions for the original BA networks and for the final rewired ones. Left image: lin-log scales;
right image: log-log scales. The distributions for the rewired graphs are shown for two levels of network noise. For high levels of noise, distributions
tend to the exponential type, otherwise they are closer to the original power-law. Values are averages over 1000 graph realizations for each curve.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025555.g004
Figure 5. Asymptotic distribution of strategies in the TS plane in rewired networks using replicator dynamics. Strategy update
dynamics is asynchronous. Leftmost image: static rewired network (see text). Middle and rightmost images refer to dynamic graphs with frequency v
of network rewiring of 0.1 and 1, respectively. Initial density of cooperators is 0.5 uniformly distributed at random in all cases. Values are averages
over 100 independent runs.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025555.g005
Network Fluctuations Hinder Cooperation
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 October 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 10 | e25555as an update rule instead of an imitative rule such as replicator
dynamics causes a serious loss of cooperation in the PD on BA
scale-free networks which recover the mean-field case.
In the present work, inspired by the empirical observation that
networks are never completely static, we have shown that several
forms of random fluctuation of the network links lead to a marked
loss of cooperation that affects all the games’ phase space, even for
moderate amounts of noise. The result is robust because,
irrespective of the precise form of network noise, the same
phenomenon manifests itself: asymptotically cooperation tends to
disappear in the PD, and it diminishes in the other games.
Moreover, network fluctuations appear to be more important than
strategy noise in provoking a loss of cooperation. All the above
refers to BA scale-free graphs and the general conclusion is that
these population structures are not robust enough as cooperation
amplifiers, as many factors may contribute to impair the ideal
results. Network fluctuations, which certainly must occur in real-
life, are among the most important factors. As a result, it can be
said that, when the amount of noise is non-negligible, the system
tends to behave in a mean-field way and thus the well-mixed
population description seems to be adequate. This can be seen
visually by comparing our figures with v~1 with those for
complete graphs that appear in [7] and [3]. The main reason for
this behavior is the fluctuation of the neighborhood seen by each
agent due to global network noise which, to some extent,
resembles population mixing.
However, it has to be said that these model networks, although
similar in some sense, do not represent well enough actual social
networks; for instance, they do not have enough clustering,
community structure, and degree correlations, among others. It
would be interesting to see what is the effect of noise on games on
social networks. Work is in progress in this direction. Finally, the
negative conclusion that cooperation in scale-free networks is
hindered by exogenous random network dynamics, should be
taken with caution. It is valid when strategy evolution and network
dynamics are completely uncorrelated as it was the case in the
present study. However, it has been shown that when cutting and
forming links in a co-evolving network has a strategic dimension to
it, then cooperation can thrive and be stable since severing and
reforming links is purposeful and based either on game payoff, or
on game-related considerations (see, for instance, [4,8–10]). From
a social point of view, the difference is whether an agent can
purposefully manipulate her environment, or is just under the
influence of external network forces that she cannot control. In our
opinion, both cases, as well as mixed situations may exist in reality.
The study presented here belongs to the first stylized situation.
Methods
Population Structure
The population of players is a connected undirected graph
G(V,E), where the set of vertices V represents the agents, while the
set of edges E represents their symmetric interactions. The
population size N is the cardinality of V. The set of neighbors of
an agent i is defined as: Vi~fj[V Ddist(i,j)~1g, and its
cardinality is the degree ki of vertex i[V. The average degree of
the network is called SkT and P(k) denotes its degree distribution
function, i.e. the probability that an arbitrarily chosen node has
degree k. For the network topology we use the classical Baraba ´si–
Albert [31] networks. BA networks are grown incrementally
starting with a clique of m0 nodes. At each successive time step a
new node is added such that its m#m0 edges link it to m nodes
already present in the graph. It is assumed that the probability p
that a new node will be connected to node i depends on the
current degree ki of the latter. This is called the preferential attachment
rule. The probability p(ki) of node i to be chosen is given by
p(ki)~ki=
P
j kj, where the sum is over all nodes already in the
graph. The model evolves into a stationary network with power-
law probability distribution for the vertex degree P(k)*k{c, with
c*3. For the simulations, we started with a clique of m0=9 nodes
and, at each time step, the new incoming node has m=4 links.
Table 4. Asymptotic average cooperation fraction in static
and dynamic networks with edge rewiring (see text) using
replicator dynamics as a strategy update rule.
PD SD SH
Static Networks 0.072 0.696 0.588
Dynamic Network (v~0:1) 0.057 0.678 0.595
Dynamic Network (v~1:0) 0.009 0.544 0.528
Values refer to Fig. 5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025555.t004
Figure 6. Asymptotic distribution of strategies in the TS plane in static and dynamic BA networks using the Fermi rule (see text).
Initial density of cooperators is 0.5 uniformly distributed at random in all cases. In all cases b=0.1. Leftmost image: the static case. Middle image:
frequency of graph renewal v~0:1. Right image: v~1. Values are averages over 100 independent runs.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025555.g006
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In evolutionary game theory, one must specify how individual’s
payoffs are computed and how agents decide to revise their present
strategy. In the standard theory, there is a very large well-mixed
population; however, when the model is applied to a finite
population whose members are the vertices of a graph, each agent
j can only interact with agents contained in the neighborhood V(j),
i.e. only local interactions are permitted.
Let si[fa,bg be the current strategy of player i and let us call M
the payoff matrix of the game. The quantity
Pi(t)~
X
j[Vi
si(t) M sT
j (t)
is the accumulated payoff collected by agent i at time step t and
si(t) is a vector giving the strategy profile at time t. Several strategy
update rules are commonly used. Here we shall describe three of
them that have been used in our simulations.
The first rule is to switch to the strategy of the neighbor that has
scored best in the last time step. This imitation of the best policy can
be described in the following way: the strategy si(t) of individual i
at time step t will be
si(t)~sj(t{1),
where
j[fVi|ig s:t: Pj~maxfPk(t{1)g, Vk[fVi|ig:
That is, individual i will adopt the strategy of the player with the
highest payoff among its neighbors including itself. If there is a tie,
the winner individual is chosen uniformly at random, but
otherwise the rule is deterministic.
The local replicator dynamics rule is stochastic [32]. Player i’s
strategy si is updated by drawing another player j from the
neighborhood Vi with uniform probability, and replacing si by sj
with probability:
p(si?sj)~(Pj{Pi)=K,
if PjwPi, and keeping the same strategy if PjƒPi.
K~max(ki,kj)½(max(1,T){min(0,S) , with ki and kj being
the degrees of nodes i and j respectively, ensures proper
normalization of the probability p(si?sj).
The last strategy revision rule is the Fermi rule [2]:
p(si?sj)~
1
1zexp({b(Pj{Pi))
:
This gives the probability that player i switches from strategy si
to sj,w h e r ej is a randomly chosen neighbor of i. Pj{Pi is
the difference of payoffs earned by j and i respectively. The
parameter b in the function gives the amount of noise: a low b
corresponds to high probability of error and, conversely, high b
means low error rates. This interpretation comes from physics,
where the reciprocal of b is called the temperature. Consequently,
payoffs will be more noisy as temperature is raised (b is lowered).
Simulation Parameters
The BA networks used in all simulations are of size N=2000
with mean degree SkT~8. The TS plane has been sampled with a
grid step of 0.05 and each value in the phase space reported in the
figures is the average of 100 independent runs, using a fresh graph
realization for each run. The initial graph for each run doesn’t
change in the static case, while it evolves in the dynamic case, as
described in the main text. Note that steady states have always
been reached when strategies evolve on a static graph. We first let
the system evolve for a transient period of 2000|N^4|106 time
steps. After a steady state is reached past the transient, averages
are calculated during 2006N additional time steps. True
equilibrium states in the sense of stochastic stability are not
guaranteed to be reached by the simulated dynamics. For this
reason we prefer to use the terms steady states which are states that
have little or no fluctuation over an extended period of time. In the
case of fluctuating networks, the system as a whole never reaches a
steady state in the sense specified above. This is due to the fact that
the link dynamics remains always active. However, the distribution
of strategies on the network does converge to a state that shows
little fluctuation, i.e. a steady state.
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